ABSTRACT
Having completed their training in Military Combat Work (MCW) in the Eastern Bloc by the early months of 1976, the first of the new generation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) recruits were prepared for infiltration into South Africa by the mid-year. This article tells the story of the first unit to be deployed into South Africa in the new phase of the African National Congress’s (ANC) armed struggle. It details some of the challenges they faced implementing the lessons of MCW in the practical circumstances faced in South Africa. The years preceding 1976 had seen the ANC unable to prosecute military operations within South Africa owing to the logistical challenges of launching incursions to South Africa from their bases in Zambia and Tanzania. Independence for Angola and Mozambique had made such incursions possible, but only just, as this article shows. It explains how issues of command and control in a theatre of war spread over the whole southern African region remained formidable problems for the movement. This was the major factor that stalled the endeavours of this unit in reaching the state where it could begin operating militarily. It was a mix-up that occurred during an attempt that was made to establish contact between the ANC’s internal and external structures to discuss these issues, which led to the collapse of the mission. Finally, the article will consider the lessons learned by the ANC from the mission, and explain the significance of the experience within the entire context of the history of the armed struggle.
