ABSTRACT

The need for individual security, particularly security of basic rights, predates policing as we now envisage it, yet what has become the police role is deeply embedded in liberal democratic theory. In the division of social labour, police help to ensure that public order and individual rights – enshrined in the rule of law – are maintained. Quintessentially, police are social peacekeepers. Yet there are certain paradoxical aspects to this role for, to enable them to fulfil their role, we grant police powers that may infringe our rights. They are granted coercive power, permission to deceive and invade privacy, and strategic discretion that appears to be at odds with the rule of law. The task of the present chapter is to outline a way of construing the police role and constraining it in a manner that is responsive to the moral demands of liberal democratic theory. The basic argumentative conceit is contractualist – a recognition by rights-holders that their fundamental rights as social individuals are best secured by means of a civil order in which some are granted conditional jurisdictional authority to promulgate, adjudicate, and enforce rights-protective society-wide rules. The police role is largely encompassed by the enforcement aspect, though their task is broader than that of crime fighting and is better captured by the idea of social peace keeping. Insofar as police work within their role, they act on our behalf to exercise coercive and other powers that we would ordinarily be morally entitled to employ in our own defence. This is critical to their legitimacy. Their powers to coerce and otherwise infringe our rights are therefore circumscribed in various ways lest discretionary authority be misused and they transgress the boundaries of their role.