ABSTRACT
This chapter examines Kuehn's account of how Hume anticipates Kant's conception of 'antinomy' and offers a detailed description of the latter concept. It reconstructs the antithesis to the Second Antinomy and Kant's resolution of the conflict. The chapter discusses Hume's theory of sensible, extensionless indivisibles in the Treatise and how they create a neglected alternative for the antithesis of the Second Antinomy. It argues that Kant can avoid Hume's alternative without assuming transcendental idealism. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant presents four 'metaphysical' expositions that aim to reveal the nature of space and time. The antithesis of the Second Antinomy is that no composite substance is made up of simple parts and that simple substances do not exist. Collectively, the expositions argue that the representations of space and time are singular and immediate a priori representations.
