ABSTRACT
The security forces have a successful track record of taking down terrorist networks during the 1970s and 1980s, when nationalist and leftist extremist violence thrived. Despite ongoing terrorism investigations, the police en masse were able to muster riot control in time to push the "casuals" back north, something they were more prepared for. Following 9/11, radicalization has been used all too often to specify Islamic-related terrorism suspects who have dabbled in literalist Salafi teachings on their path to committing acts of extremist violence in the name of Allah. Specialized police units are called counter- or anti-terrorist (CT), while military units are called counterinsurgent (COIN). The actions of Belgian security before and during the March 2016 attacks indicate a failure on many levels in both counter-terrorism and -insurgency. Raids and "whack-a-mole" operations targeting key leaders in a criminal or terrorist network can often be unproductive in counterinsurgency.
