ABSTRACT

Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights establishes the right to free elections. Free (and fair) elections are a central constitutive element of democracy. Where voter information or the effectiveness of voter choice is limited through weak party system institutionalisation, high levels of fragmentation, the dominance of a governing party, and competition that is not programmatically structured, democracies give greater latitude to corruption. This chapter outlines the authors' theoretical approach and develops a set of four hypotheses: party system institutionalisation reduces the scope for corruption; a rise in the effective number of parties initially reduces the scope for corruption but this effect reverses at high levels of fragmentation; dominant party systems increase the scope for corruption; and party systems in which competition is ideologically structured reduce the scope for corruption. The chapter highlights some of the thorny questions that our findings raise for an approach to safeguarding free elections that is based on human rights.