ABSTRACT
Three missions to the Soviet Union in May, September, and October 1991 at the joint request of the Soviet government and the White House made four critical determinations that continue to shape the U.S. response to food supply problems in the former Soviet Union. The missions found, first, that the Soviet Union did not face a threat of widespread famine but did face deterioration in food availability; would encounter hardships on a regional basis; and needed to protect certain vulnerable groups. Second, they found that the root of most difficulties in supplying foodstuffs to the population was inefficiency in the food distribution system, not in production of agricultural commodities. Third, the missions determined that the keys to improvements in food availability are movement away from the collapsed command system and a successful move to a market economy, with establishment of private ownership and creation of free market incentives to manufacture, store, transport, and sell commodities critical elements of that effort.
Third, the missions found that the Soviet Union, traditionally a cash customer for U.S. agricultural products, needs extension of credit to maintain something approaching the historical level of food and feed imports, and that Soviet leaders preferred credit to outright grants of food aid.
