ABSTRACT
On December 30, 1991, nine of the eleven members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed an agreement providing for the continuation of what had been the Soviet space program. The future of this “post-Soviet” or CIS space program remains impossible to forecast, however, since issues such as organization and funding remain unresolved. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, space officials increasingly were forced to justify expenditures on space activities in light of the dismal economic situation in the country. Economic woes and political uncertainty in the former Soviet republics may undermine their commitment to continue the space program.
Nevertheless, more than 150 CIS satellites are currently operating, and although the launch rate is down noticeably from earlier years, it is far too early to dismiss the significance of the CIS space program. Rather it is the nature of its potential impact on U.S. space activities that has changed. While the military implications 630of former Soviet space activities have diminished, a new era of economic trade and competition has begun.
Russia is by far the most important player in the CIS space program, with approximately 80 percent of the scientific and manufacturing personnel and infrastructure for space, including one of the two CIS launch sites (Plesetsk). Kazakhstan is important because the other launch site (Tyuratam, or the Baikonur Cosmodrome) is located there, as well as facilities for research into space nuclear power and propulsion (at Semipalatinsk), and a major military research and development center (Sary Shagan). Ukraine (which has not joined the CIS space program) is the site of a major launch vehicle factory (Yuzhnoye, in Dnepropetrovsk) and an important tracking site (Yevpatoriya).
Today, CIS governments and companies (mostly Russian) are selling space products, services and technologies. This activity poses issues for U.S. policymakers who are interested in purchasing some of these items for use in U.S. space activities, are worried about potential economic competition, or are concerned that sales of Russian rocket technology to other countries might contribute to ballistic missile proliferation.
Bush Administration policy is evolving on these issues, and the subject is quite dynamic. Information in this chapter is current through June 1992, at which time President Bush was taking cautious steps toward increasing U.S.-Russian space interaction, both economic and scientific. Among the potential users of CIS space technology are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD).
