ABSTRACT
This report 1 surveys the disarray in former Soviet Union science and technology; discusses U.S. Government, professional, and private sector activities to assist former Soviet Union scientists, and examines dilemmas confronting U.S. policymakers, who appear to be cautious about augmenting S&T cooperative programs with the former Soviet Union.
New U.S. Government programs for expanded cooperation in science and technology with the republics of the former Soviet Union consist primarily of support for an international center to “retrain” former weapons scientists, small programs to include scientists in activities supplementary to existing extramural research awards made by Federal agencies, and educational exchange programs oriented to aiding former defense scientists. It is not clear that these are, or should be, large enough or designed to stem the brain drain of former Soviet Union (FSU), scientists or to strengthen the infrastructure of science.
Some say it is in the U.S. national interest to augment science and technology capacity in the former Soviet Union states in order to promote the conversion to democracy and flourishing market economies and to eliminate the potential for Soviet scientists becoming 649a source of high technology weapons proliferation to other nations. Recommendations have been made by the National Academy of Sciences, and others to devote more resources to such activities, to better design and coordinate programs, and to liberalize export control regulations that hamper commercial activity and governmental purchases of Soviet advanced technology. U.S. professional societies and the private sector have initiated some active cooperation with their counterparts in the former Soviet Union. Private foundation-funded support for FSU science exceeds the amount pledged by the U.S. Government. U.S. Government policies to deal with the science and technology capabilities in the FSU states probably would benefit if they were coordinated better with these activities.
Some policymakers believe that it may not necessarily be in the best interests of the United States to strengthen S&T in the successor republics to the former Soviet Union. It is suspected that some Soviet scientists may be industrial spies or intelligence agents who seek to “expropriate” Western technology illegally. There is also the view that strengthening Soviet capabilities poses a potential long-term security threat to the United States.
