ABSTRACT
Gassendi’s ethics is generally portrayed as a synthesis of Epicureanism and Christianity. The chapter challenges this reading by foregrounding Gassendi’s significant debt to Cicero’s Academic skepticism. As an Academic skeptic, Gassendi assesses the competing claims of philosophers, judging where there is underlying agreement among them and, when there is not, judging which view is most plausible. With respect to the central ethical topic of the highest good, Gassendi believes that Epicurus advances the most plausible position. Yet this conclusion is consistent with Gassendi disagreeing with Epicurus on other points, including giving weight to the non-instrumental value of virtue. Stepping back from the details, we find in Gassendi a distinctive form of modern philosophy that rejects the insistence of Descartes and Hobbes on a sharp break with the past and emphasizes instead the continuity of philosophical inquiry from antiquity through the seventeenth century.
