Normativity becomes a central concern in the philosophy of mind primarily through consideration of the normativity of meaning. Even the formulation of this concern is often contested, however. In the passage above, Haugeland speaks of “intelligence” rather than mind, and of “the meaningful” rather than meaning, in part to avoid the initial presumption that minds or meanings are distinctive kinds of entity. The phenomena in question can nevertheless be readily identified despite considerable disagreement about how to describe, explain, or assess them. Human capacities for experience, thought, speech, and action are paradigm cases, but their relations to one another and to other phenomena in the same vicinity are often at issue philosophically. These nearby phenomena include the behavior or capacities of (some) non-human animals; the capacities of computers, their stored programs, or their robotic bodies; and the doings of social institutions or groups, including social animals or animal societies. At the limit, the boundaries of this domain are explored by asking how to recognize meaningful thought, utterances or actions in unfamiliar or even alien form, which has generated reflections on the plight of field linguists (Quine 1960), radical interpreters (Davidson 1984), intentional stance-takers (Dennett 1987), or even field teleologists (Okrent 2007, ch. 2).