ABSTRACT
Liberalism provides one of the most powerful arguments for why speech should enjoy a privileged position. The argument rests on two key claims. The first is that there is a right to freedom of speech. This is usually described as a human or natural right. The second is that this right should be protected by some form of constitutional mechanism that limits the activity of the state. In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that from a Hobbesian point of view, such claims fail to grasp the true nature of the political state. If Hobbes is right that political power is absolutist in nature it follows that the state must be ontologically prior to any type of rights claim. It is important to notice that this is not a defence of arbitrary power; rather it is a statement about the logical structure of politics. If this claim is correct it follows that there are no rights that trump the power of the state, which obviously includes the right to free speech. I argue that the boundaries of free speech must necessarily be set by the state, which in democracies means through political contestation. It is politics, not abstract philosophical principles that determines the limits on free speech. This is not to say that philosophical principles should not inform the debate, but it does mean that they cannot settle it. Many political philosophers would contend that this leads to a flimsy defence of free speech. I claim that it leads to a more nuanced position that is not shackled by rights claims and fits better with the realities of politics.
