ABSTRACT
This paper is both an analysis of Hobbes’s absence from contemporary philosophical discussions of public policy and an argument in favor of his inclusion. My argument for Hobbes as a potentially useful source of and authority on matters of public policy takes the following form. In part one, I make my initial case, demonstrating why it is at least peculiar that Hobbes has not been taken up as Mill or Locke have been. In doing so, I describe some specific recommendations that Hobbes makes that would have great appeal to liberals of all stripes. In part two, I offer an explanation for his neglect, explaining why his recommendations have not been taken up by those who would likely agree with their outcomes. First, the ‘good’ Hobbesian recommendations are mixed in with far less attractive ones. Second, Hobbes’s justifications for an individual policy are often far less appealing than the policy itself. Nevertheless, in part three, I argue that we ought to reconsider our resistance to Hobbesian insight. By revisiting both basic Hobbesian principles and some of his most problematic examples, I call attention to certain features of his account that suggest his most unattractive provisions might well require revision in light of Hobbes’s own criteria. Furthermore, the distinctively Hobbesian perspective on public policy that I will draw out can, I suggest, be usefully applied to certain ongoing debates (examples include same sex marriage and the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell). Not only are the conclusions ones that the progressive liberal would want to embrace, but also, his methods and approaches add a distinctive voice to the discussion, a voice able to avoid some of the criticism that plagues other progressive approaches.
