ABSTRACT
This article sets out to explore whether the category of ‘terrorism’ improves or impedes our intellectual understanding of violence. By addressing key concepts at the heart of common definitions of terrorism, the article asks these questions: What does the category of ‘terrorism’ mean for that violence that is, by definition, left beyond the scope of terrorism studies? What assumptions about violence per se are exposed by definitions of terrorism? It is argued, first, that definitions of terrorism that place the targeting of civilians as the central defining feature of the term rest on the assumption of distinct ethical categories of human beings, categories that this article argues do not reflect the human condition in war. Second, it is argued that definitions of terrorism that have ‘intent’ as the central defining feature restate and reinforce the principle of the doctrine of double effect. Third, those definitions that label terrorism as a communicative form of violence – violence intended to send a message – expose and perpetuate a lack of understanding of what violence is and does. Finally, the treatment of terrorism as a distinctly ‘bad’ form of violence suggests that another category of violence exists – one that does not function as terrorism does: ‘good’ violence. The category of terrorism sustains the notion that political violence is controllable and can be made fit for purpose. In conclusion, the article argues that the concept of terrorism serves to sustain the taken-for-granted notion that violence works – that another violence, one that does not function as terrorism does – is possible.
