ABSTRACT
In her Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum leaves the problem of future generations to one side, on the back of the assertion that Rawls’ theory can be extended to give plausible answers to it. Neither a discussion of the merits of Rawls’ solution and how it fits in with her theory, nor of how the inclusion of future generations impacts on her own theory is provided. Following an examination of Rawls’ solution to future generations, this article contends that it is unclear how (and whether) Nussbaum is able to accept Rawls’ (so-called) solution given fundamental differences in their theories. More importantly, this article demonstrates that Nussbaum overlooks the problem of future generations at significant cost. In leaving this problem to one side, Nussbaum underplays the significance of future generations and overlooks the way this problem bears on her theory. This article shows that future generations place pressure on fundamental elements in Nussbaum’s capability theory—including, for instance, the capability for bodily integrity, the threshold level of dignity and the (partial) incompleteness. In highlighting these shortfalls, this article concludes with an account of some of the challenges to consider in constructing a capability theory able to deal with future generations.
