ABSTRACT
Planners continue to bemoan the presumed gap between theory and practice. This gap is typically framed by practitioners as a knowledge transfer problem, because theoretical knowledge is assumed to be devoid of practical transferability. By contrast, many scholars maintain that theory and practice necessitate distinct kinds of knowledges that are shaped by equally distinct ontological and epistemological standpoints. Yet, as Friedmann (1987) reminds us, planning is an interventionist activity that operates at the interface of knowledge and action. Planning theories and practices therefore neither stand in opposition to each other, nor do they substitute each other. Rather, theories and practices complement one another, since, as planners, we need to simultaneously draw on technical (techne), theoretical (episteme), practical, and ethical knowledge (collectively, phronesis) if we hope to “set something new into the world” (Friedmann 2014, p.2). Friedmann’s idea of setting something new into the world-which is inspired by Arendt’s work-thus necessitates “some form of action that, however small, will help pave the way into the future” (ibid.). In other words, “planning actions need to be oriented towards the future” (ibid.). This action and future-oriented conceptualization of planning entails at
least five important operations (Friedmann 2014): (1) a strategy about how to proceed, (2) an ethical judgement by which the action itself can be justified, (3) taking responsibility for the consequences of planning actions, (4) politics to guide planning actions, and (5) a process that allows for ongoing feedback through social learning. I will return to each operation during later discussions of our studio-based project in Langrug. For now, I briefly focus on Friedmann’s social learning epistemology, as this “way of knowing” shaped the overall design and delivery of the Langrug project. Longstanding critiques of the limitations of knowledge production
through “scientific,” unitary, and universal methods alone, spurred Friedmann (1973, 1978) to initiate a theory of “mutual learning” that involves the production of knowledge amongst diverse actors who come together to consider a common undertaking. Various refinements of this theory ultimately led
Friedmann (1987, 2011, 2014) to posit “social learning” as an epistemology for planning. Explicitly stated, social learning is grounded in the idea of the coproduction of knowledge. Knowing how to do something-and knowing what to do-thus emerges through continuous and respectful dialogues and engaged social practices amongst all participants of a social learning endeavor (Friedmann 1979). These kinds of assertions then suggest that the gap between theory and practice might be understood as a knowledge production problem (as opposed to a transferability problem or a concern for separating different kinds of knowledges), since different actors do not hold, in their individual capacity, a monopoly over knowledge production. Rather, “learning takes place in the company of others” (Saltmarsh et al. 2009, p.7), because knowledge production is inherently a transactional, open ended, and social activity that takes place in a situated context. For Argyris and Schön (1996), Dewey (1938), and other action-oriented
scholars, knowledge must be actionable if it is to be useful. However, Friedmann (1979, 1987) cautions against restricting “useful” knowledge to a narrow understanding of control and instrumentalism, as narrow foci tend to lead to shortsighted outcomes that negate possibilities for transformative actions. At the same time, Friedmann (2011) acknowledges that when planning with diverse actors who hold different standpoints, conflicts may arise. In response, Friedmann (2011) speaks of working with and through conflicts not by ignoring them but, instead, by placing conflicts and power at the center of an inquiry. Strategies that aim to ignore or oppress conflicts amongst actors equally suppress freedoms of inquiry. An approach to planning that is purposefully geared towards accommodating task-oriented conflicts-while simultaneously working with and through interpersonal conflicts-might enable more effective forms of learning and doing than consensus-dependent approaches (Fainstein 2010; Flyvbjerg 2001; Friedmann 2011). While social learning can take place in different contexts through various
approaches, my interpretation of Friedmann’s epistemology for planning takes shape through a method of “engaged scholarship” (Boyer 1996) that concerns both the discursive and the material nature of planning. Engaged scholarships allow for the coproduction of knowledge by explicitly desisting from establishing narrow strategies that converge on a “correct” answer. Instead, such scholarships involve multiple perspectives on how to tackle an identified problem. Furthermore, engaged scholarships-or community-university engagements-challenge traditional approaches to teaching and learning. They expose students to real-world complexities by allowing them to explore “a world they will actually work in” (Connell 2009, p.225). community-university engagements also expose students to a range of skills that cannot be acquired through academic study alone. And by valuing multiple knowledge claims, I hope to inspire students to become empathic and reflective practitioners who are capable of examining their own professional values when learning with community partners. Thus, for those of us who facilitate communityuniversity engagements through our studio-based or other courses, we do so
because we hope to transform our teaching and learning endeavors through collaborative praxes that challenge hierarchical modes of knowledge production. In this chapter, I present a story of our engagements with community leaders
and residents from Langrug-an informal settlement located within the municipal boundaries of Stellenbosch, South Africa. Here, in Langrug, we were able to leverage participants’ distinct competencies because we adopted an approach to social leaning that included all five of Friedmann’s (2014) operations.
