ABSTRACT
Cyprus.15 The DPC accepted that the two countries had difficulties in meeting NATO prerequisites,16 but it was clear that their problems also partially derived from their emphasis on large size and low-quality standing armies, intended to be used locally and probably in a bilateral conflict. This caused the discomfort of the other members of the alliance, and the British Embassy in Athens acidly commented that, ‘Greece, like Turkey, has spent the past year rattling a sabre in one hand [on the Cyprus conflict] and a begging bowl in the other’.17 Arguably, this was among the reasons why NATO felt it necessary to declare that it would not interfere in a Greek-Turkish conflict. In 1965, as NATO was studying its new posture of ‘forward defence’ (which called for smaller but technologically advanced forces), the DPC indicated that Greece and Turkey were omitted from the study, ‘since their national resources do not permit them to sustain their defence programmes without external aid’.18 Indeed, Greece and Turkey made reservations in the 1965 NATO annual review to the effect that they would not be able to meet the alliance’s force goals, unless they received ‘adequate and timely external aid’.19 By 1966-7, when the new alliance posture was decided, it was clear that the two countries were unable to meet its financial requirements. Once more, during the period of tense Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in the mid-1960s, elements of common stance or even co-operation to secure common interests within NATO became evident. This indicates that, even at times of bilateral crisis, the alliance indirectly was a possible field of co-operation or convergence. It is probable that similar findings will appear in later stages of the post-war era as well.
