ABSTRACT
Corruption and scandalization cycles are in fact related, but the former is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the latter, as the Italian case clearly shows. Two political effects may then follow exposed corruption: a physiological failing of consent and support towards involved politicians and parties; a pathological increase of frictions and conflict between the judiciary as well as the media system and the political power. The robustness of Italian corruption also owes much to its internal dynamics, that is, to the deep-rootedness of the endogenous features of the relationships between the political, administrative and economic actors involved. The aim is to promote the introduction, with the input of Transparency International, of integrity pacts as a model for the adoption and dissemination of best practices in public contracting procedures. This new approach represents a shift from a never-implemented regulatory model of anti-corruption policy, with universal requirements and state monitoring of their application and enforcement, to a contractual model.
