ABSTRACT
Irrespective of emotional response, all interviewees felt that their representative role within the processes and structures of formal Muslim-governmental relations meant that it was necessary for them to communicate with government on the matter. For some, this need to ‘represent’ outweighed their own reaction and response. Inevitably for all, this involved translating the untranslatable, the feelings and emotions experienced in the sphere of the spiritual, personal and community to the language, processes and structures of the political and institutional. From analysing the interviews, three types of political narratives seemed to shape the concerns of interviewees, subsequently becoming the drivers for their ensuing responses. These were: (1) the cultural politics of Muslim communities and debates about their position in society; (2) the politics of representation shaping Muslim-governmental interaction; and (3) the geopolitical imperative to ensure that tensions and violence in volatile states such as Libya, Egypt and Pakistan were not escalated by events in the UK or vice versa. On the first of these, the cultural politics of the Rushdie affair revolved around
notions of what was considered to be artistic licence and the challenging of the fundamentally liberal principle of free speech. Writing in retrospect, Parekh (2006) suggested that British Muslims’ reaction to The Satanic Verses betrayed a lack of understanding of liberal discourse, citing a conceptual problem in the gap of understanding of the ‘sacred’ and ‘free speech’ between Muslims and liberals equally. Indeed, much has been written about the tensions between free speech and the right to offend (Jones 1990; Slaughter 1993; Modood et al. 2006), but further to this, Parekh cited the inability of Muslim representatives to effectively communicate and engage due to being ill versed in the language of British cultural and political discourse (Parekh 2006, 205). The memories that interviewees had of the Rushdie affair were the same, demonstrating disappointment and frustration at the inability of Muslims to communicate the reasons for their strength of feeling at the time. Such a critique would certainly not apply to the Muslim representatives interviewed,
many of whom showed nuanced understandings of the cultural politics through which their responses might be viewed. It is widely documented how Muslims, and Islam, are stereotypically seen to be violent, barbaric, anti-Western and more (CBMI 1997; Allen 2010; Vakil 2010) and so it was unsurprising that all of the interviewees were starkly aware of the need to respond and act in ways that did not reinforce the stereotypes. The interviews demonstrated how Muslim organizations and individuals are increasingly attuned to the ways in which any publicity of an angry reaction by even a tiny minority might be misconstrued as an ‘extreme’ reaction by a whole ‘community’. This self-awareness seemed to stem from the experiences of controversies that had preceded the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ incident, which most saw as having been presented as a battle of Islam against the West, religious against secular, liberal against illiberal (Asad 1990; Mazrui 1990; CBMI 1997; Sturges 2006; Hussain 2007). As one interviewee said: ‘it was going to be portrayed as an issue of freedom of speech against the sensitivity of Muslims. That’s an unhelpful dichotomy’ (Interviewee 5). Interviewees spoke of trying to overcome this dichotomy by speaking in more
nuanced terms about the offence potentially caused by the video. Furthermore, the
C. and
increased bicultural understanding of those interviewed was reflected in the ways in which both the video and the more extreme reactions to it were condemned without hesitation or delay. As with The Satanic Verses, the character of the Prophet was paramount. Interestingly however, interviewees did not refer to him in the context of his vilification in the video but in his role as an exemplar. For them, Muhammad was the benchmark against which Muslim response had to be measured, several interviewees citing parables about him reacting peacefully even when insulted:
We remember the taunts of Arabic poets to the Prophet Muhammad, and the old woman who threw rubbish in his path.3 He never reacted violently. If someone does something violent and disproportionate in response then for me it shows a lack of Islamic etiquette. (Interviewee 6)
Another similarly said:
With the more violent protests around the world – they claim to be upholding the honour of the Prophet but in fact they are destroying his legacy and what he stood for. Remember the story of the Prophet being abused, the woman who threw rubbish at him. (Interviewee 5)
Changes in the way in which the British government dealt with the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ controversy were also evident. In the aftermath of the Rushdie protests, the British Home Secretary Douglas Hume spoke to Muslim leaders asking for greater integration; this was followed by his fellow minister Chris Patten publishing a guide entitled, On Being British (Asad 1990). This time the government’s response was not nearly so clumsy or accusatory. British Foreign Secretary William Hague stated to parliament's Foreign Affairs committee that while the film was contemptible, it provided no excuse for violence (Quinn and Torchia 2012). This subdued response reflected the largely calmer British Muslim response. All of the interviewees asserted the need for British Muslims to be positive and extremely proactive in relation to such controversies. For them, it was a necessary counterbalance to a media focus on the more fringe elements within Britain’s Muslim communities. Such inappropriate responses were seen to include those who refused to condemn the violent protests internationally and the more confrontational responses of some British Muslim groups. One interviewee said: ‘The reaction of the Muslims here in the UK were right – messages were sent out not to rise to the bait and to follow the Prophet’s example of forgiveness; that [international] violence was not right’ (Interviewee 1).
