ABSTRACT
Introduction This chapter serves two purposes. First, it complements discussion in the previous chapters, which has revolved around the meanings of “science,” competition between different philosophies of science, and ways in which we might deal with such contention in the service of creating useful insight for IR, with a specific focus on the role of theory for knowledge creation. As empirical research is, in essence, always about comparing our hunches to data, scientific progress through empirical research depends vitally on the quality of our hunches, that is, on the manner in which we construct and apply theory. I plead for a view of the role of theory that is compatible with this volume’s guiding notion of sociable pluralism – a view, I hold, that is in principle compatible with the entire range of philosophies of science laid out by Patrick Jackson (Chapter 1), yet aligns most closely with Colin Wight’s (Chapter 2) critical realist take on the requirements for theoretical validity and utility. The second purpose of this chapter is to serve as a link between the two halves of this volume by drawing together arguments from all other chapters to present a systematic and coherent view on the role of theory to facilitate the ongoing discussion between different takes on philosophy of science in IR as represented in this book. In this way, this chapter also sets the stage for moving on to the following case study, carried out over several chapters, of the democratic peace. I intentionally leave open the question of how “progress” in our field should be defined.1 It can mean cumulation of knowledge, to the extent that we can reach agreement that knowledge has cumulated. Yet progress can also legitimately be defined differently. In any instance, I hold that there can be no objective criteria to measure progress, since as IR scholars we are engaged in an inherently social and political activity. Our standards are what we make them and, while we have a minimum of openness, will always be contested.2 Thence, Torbjørn Knutsen’s argument in Chapter 3 reveals a paradox: quality social science depends on open societies, yet it is precisely to the extent that our societies are free that we will never agree on how well we are doing our work. It is true that, as Fred Chernoff argues in Chapter 5, using the same criteria of evaluation could be a key driver of progress. Yet we cannot agree on such criteria, and
very probably should not.3 It is easier, however, to reach agreement on the role of theory in the process and that, then, is my way into this discussion. At least since Martin Wight complained more than half a century ago that “International theory, or what there is of it, is scattered, unsystematic, and mostly inaccessible to the layman” (Wight, 1960), we have suspected that IR may have a problem with the use of theory in the service of creating useful knowledge. Wight blamed this weakness of theory about the International, first, on a preoccupation of those (few) who are inclined to think theoretically about politics with the domain of state sovereignty (as opposed to the domain of IR, which lies mostly beyond the realm of state sovereignty). He also blamed it, second, on the general gloominess of the international realm, which seems stuck in inescapable normatively undesirable patterns. Quite paradoxically, the very fact that strong patterns can be observed in the international realm, which should make that domain particularly amenable to successful theorizing, reduces our motivation to do so, according to Wight.4 This relates directly to an important point raised by Piki Ish-Shalom in Chapter 8 of this volume: our theories (and the concepts of which they are comprised) always reflect our normative commitments (see also Bevir and Kadar, 2008). It is thence unsurprising if scholars fail to develop and use theories which would seem to represent realities unpalatable to them. Thence, also, arise the constitutive silences in our field of which Laura Sjoberg speaks in Chapter 9. Theoretical endeavors on the margins of the discipline have a hard time being heard in the mainstream; this is also because those who “run the show” in international politics and in IR would not like to see the world, and their roles within it, in the ways proposed from the margins. These are important caveats which I place front and center, as they determine to a large extent the substance of the theories which will be constructed and applied and therefore define our field and its development, as sketched by Knutsen in Chapter 3. And still, in spite of the power structures and mechanisms of socialization in place in the praxis of international politics as well as the scholarship of IR, Martin Wight’s basic observation that our field fails to display theoretical integration remains valid. The question is: How should we feel about that? Calls for theoretical integration should always ring alarm bells, as they represent a search for closure at odds with the determined openness and willingness to embrace failure of a critical scholar (see Sjoberg, Chapter 9). Yet the anxiety raised by Wight does connect with at least two aspects of IR scholarship that may indeed be viewed as problematic. They will be introduced here and explained more fully later in the chapter. The first is the strong drive which has characterized and shaped our discipline to develop and defend “grand” theories which are both abstract and general enough to lay claim to some form of disciplinary unification. This is a result of Wightian anxiety which never quite seems to leave us. Kenneth Waltz’s assertion, made in 1975, that balance-of-power (bo-p) theory is the “only” theory of international relations can be better understood before this backdrop (Waltz, 1975). Theory, in Waltz’s view, requires abstraction from context and should point to general patterns characterizing the
domain (and level of analysis) examined – in our case that of international politics. While there are other attempts at generalization about international political patterns than b-o-p, they are in his view little more than vague conceptualizations, lacking clear and stable specifications of the relevant variables. Waltz’s influential judgment of the landscape of IR theory thus clearly shows twin biases in favor of maximum generalization and variable analysis combined. As much as more novel approaches since the constructivist turn have sought to delegitimize such grand explanatory theorizing, we seem not to have really gotten over this drive, even as it has not led to unification. Instead we remain suspended in rivalry between different grand theories which often appear incommensurable and whose applicability to real-world problems is, due to their abstract and general nature, highly precarious. The second, and connected, problem invoked by Wight’s critique is the “cacophony” mentioned in this volume’s introduction. A few years ago Snidal and Wendt (2009) disputed Wight largely on his own terms, coming to the conclusion that much of the malaise he diagnosed a half century ago has been overcome, as International Theory has rapidly developed alongside greater faith in the possibility of progress in world politics – thus ameliorating both problems he identified as causing the dearth of theory in our field. However, Snidal and Wendt also pointed out that “different theoretical communities are not engaging each other in ways that could be mutually productive.” Yet more recently, a much discussed special issue of the European Journal of International Relations on “The end of International Relations theory?” also stressed the “coexistence and competition between an ever-greater number of theories” and advocates a very careful move toward greater coherence termed “integrative pluralism” (Dunne et al., 2013).5 Knutsen warns us in Chapter 3 that we have so far only escaped a situation of endless accumulation of theories and “theoretical overload” by allowing old theories to quietly fade away through an “arrogance of the present” and a tendency to focus on current events. Clearly we face a time when the nature and quality of theorizing in IR, as well as the extent to which the field’s theories can and should provide it with some form of coherent disciplinary identity, are very much under discussion. At stake is ultimately the question which underlies this volume: How do we achieve “progress,” whatever that means? Which ways of constructing and applying theory work for advancing our field? The main fault line in this discussion tends to run between those who seek greater theoretical integration (in this book: Chernoff, Hayes and James, Harrison) and those who are skeptical of such moves (in this book: Jackson, Ish-Shalom, Sjoberg).6 But there are a great many other disagreements that divide either camp or run across them. I begin this chapter by considering the basic questions of what theory is in the first place and what its functions are for social scientific research. I then return to the specifics of our field and elaborate on the particular challenges faced here with respect to the use of theory. The chapter ends with a discussion of how, in the service of sociable pluralism, we might define theoretical validity and utility in ways that can be compatible with a broad range of philosophy of science positions. Along
the way, I will tie together different elements of the arguments made by my colleagues in the other chapters of this book.
