It is often claimed or assumed that justice requires people to have equal amounts of something. The ‘something’ in question needn’t necessarily be income or wealth; it might be liberty, or basic constitutional rights, or indeed something less immediately tangible, such as happiness or respect for persons or consideration on the part of others. Saying which of these things ought to be equalized, and why, is one important part of the activity of constructing an egalitarian theory of justice. One reason why it is important is that, if one surveys the above list of candidate equalizanda, one immediately realizes that not all of them can be jointly equalized. Given human nature, to equalize one of those goods is necessarily to accept that other goods must be unequal. For example, libertarians favour according equal respect to individuals considered as bearers of libertarian property rights. But, to respect individuals equally as bearers of libertarian property rights is necessarily to reject an egalitarian ‘pattern’ of wealth distribution among individuals, given the differences between those individuals in terms of talents and skills, tastes, motivation, luck, and so on (see Justice). Vice versa, a government that pursues equality of wealth cannot show equal respect for rights-bearers as these are conceived by libertarians.