ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990s, the body and experiences of embodiment have become significant subjects of sociological research and theory. In particular, the works of Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu have offered serious theoretical frameworks that have inspired a plethora of empirical studies. However, as Nick Crossley argues in this chapter, the value of these approaches is tempered by shortcomings and Crossley contends “that the interactionist theories of Cooley and, in particular, Mead, provide a persuasive way forward.” Hinging his articulation of “reflective embodiment” on three claims – each of which is directly derived from the most fundamental cornerstones of the pragmatic tradition of symbolic interaction – Crossley neatly frames the body and embodiment as embedded, and actively fashioned in reflexive looking-glasses. Tracing his conceptualization of “reflexive embodiment” to both Cooley and Mead while also connecting with contemporary interests and empirical works, Crossley offers a decidedly interactionist framework that avoids pesky shortcomings of dominant theoretical perspectives of the body and embodiment.
