The concept of ‘lessons-learned’ has become a growth industry in the realm of academic, and not so academic, writing on Western strategic and operational processes within defence and security topics. 1 In the aftermath of failed operations to reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan into viable, functioning states, many questions about what the post-Iraq and Afghanistan world holds for the use of military power are being asked, particularly regarding doctrinal and tactical matters. 2 The limited utility of Western military power in dealing with the Arab Spring, Libya, Syria and now the threat posed by the rise of Islamic State, has created a groundswell of literature that all points to lessons of the near-past having to be studied in order to learn lessons as to, primarily, identify what went wrong and how to avoid repeating such mistakes in the future. In the United Kingdom (UK) in particular, this search for lessons is manifest in the much-delayed Iraq Inquiry set up under the leadership of Sir John Chilcot. 3 As such, most of the lessons-learned processes are reactive and avoidance oriented, instead of proactive and initiative oriented. Furthermore, the majority of these inquiries and questions about lessons learned are land warfare oriented. This focus on a land environment approach for trying to use the lessons of the past, both near and distant historical examples, belies the true nature of the current UK strategic need: to understand the use of sea power and the maritime domain.