ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the Humean strictures on what can count as actual and as a property. To understand the importance of this, and thus the importance of the Ungrounded Argument, it is first seen what would be the likely response to Ungrounded Argument (UA) from a Humean. Neo-Humeans will find the conclusion of the Ungrounded Argument unacceptable so will be obliged to look for an error in one or more of its premises. The chapter argues that the conclusion is acceptable and that Humeans do not find it so because they place unjustified strictures on what can count as actual and what can count as a property. All the premises of the Ungrounded Argument seem strong and have support from philosophy or science or both. Thus, the chapter shows that the notion of an ungrounded disposition is coherent, even where it is one that remains unmanifested.
