ABSTRACT
This chapter clarifies how some of the main points of Edward Westermarck's observations in social anthropology and philosophy stand in the light of the criticism that British philosopher G. E. Moore levelled against them. The debate between them, although limited to a brief exchange, is concrete evidence of the relevance that moral philosophers of the time assigned to the themes that Westermarck was addressing. By linking the questions they raised to current debates on the relations between emotion and morality, the chapter shows why these issues still pose pressing questions to moral philosophers of today. It argues that both parties share certain basic assumptions about the relation between emotions and facts; assumptions that are problematic. The chapter articulates an alternative view of the role of emotion in moral understanding. This view incorporates what appears to be correct in the views of both Westermarck and Moore, but does not land in an unresolved conflict between subjectivity and objectivity.
