ABSTRACT

The defence of duress per minas in the context of the Commentaries to the US Model Penal Code, is atypical within the taxonomy of general defences in criminal law. Normative judgements must apply about the personal responsibility of the duressee. The duressee does not operate involuntarily in a fashion akin to automatism. The moral evaluation of the actor's conduct is related to fair opportunity within the purview of duress as a defence. An overt public policy constraint has been interposed to confine duress within narrow limits, but intractable problems have been created over admissible personal characteristics. The virtually unassailable position in Anglo-American common law has been that duress never excuses murder. It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense. A schism applies between common and civil law jurisdictions in their construction of the ambit of duress as a defence to murder. Practical reforms are needed to the defence.