ABSTRACT
Since the 1970s, when America assumed responsibility for Persian Gulf stability in the wake of the British departure, no strategic framework devised by the United States has lasted more than a decade; all have failed to keep the peace. Disruption and instability have sometimes been due to global and regional political changes, like the collapse of the Soviet Union or the Iranian revolution, but the failure has also been due to the dif culties in devising a coherent strategy. These include inherent contradictions between the ends and means of policy; problems in accommodating the interests of regional powers with those of the U.S.; and deep seated contradictions among the Persian Gulf states themselves, where con icting territorial and ideological interests make a local condominium dif cult, if not impossible. The current crisis is no exception. In the wake of 9/11, the new U.S. strategy was ambitious, even revolutionary, encompassing many new goals and instruments: pre-emptive war, the use of military instruments to achieve regime change, and the spread of democracy in the region. However, despite bold statements and actions, the contradictions between ends and means (using the military instrument to bring democratic change), between regional and U.S. aims (“occupation” vs. “liberation”), and intra-regional contradictions (pro-and anti-U.S. regimes) soon became glaringly apparent. In the face of hard facts on the ground in Iraq, the U.S. administration has had to scale back its aims to accord with the reality and faces serious pressures to withdraw its troops. How much of its bold new strategy will remain is uncertain. Some of the outcome will depend upon the next administration in Washington; more will depend on the realities on the ground. Some of the radical new agenda will, of necessity, remain – the need for nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the pressure for reform, now de ned as moderation, in the Gulf – but the strategy is likely to become more realistic and less visionary over time as the costs of regime change and unilateralism mount.
