ABSTRACT
Scalia's 'originalism' is taken to be staunch conservatism, thinly disguised in a seemingly all too atavistic theory of legal meaning. Indeed, originalism implies that the contemporary meaning of the Constitution is to come down to its meaning as understood by its Framers and their contemporaries, so far from 1787 to 1992. Anyway, the standard criticism disqualifying originalism as political conservatism thinly disguised as a theory of constitutional and statutory interpretation may not be tenable after all. Originalism's real strengths and weaknesses are to be found elsewhere. In essence, originalism is a simple and straightforward conception of statutory and constitutional interpretation. Also, Scalia discusses originalism in the historical and legal/political contexts of the United States, without taking clear stances concerning constitutional interpretation and adjudication. Originalism's practical answer to such philosophical queries may come down to something like: there may still be something like an approximation to Framers meaning which is historically more adequate than other approximations.
