ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the China's urban frenzy is rooted within institutions and incentives that have developed between the central and local authorities, notably related to the allocation of taxes and the promotion of party cadres. It introduces the conundrum of Nanjing's superfast urban expansion: it increases much faster than population growth, has made real estate the main driver of the local economy, and seems to be spurring an inefficient energy profile for the city in the long run. The chapter shows that urban planning under central control is currently more a myth than a reality, a situation that is the unavoidable consequence of contradictory demands from central government on local authorities. It insists that stakeholder groups also take advantage of dynamics, although one can rightfully wonder if there can be a winner in the longer run. The chapter focuses on the population and Gross domestic product (GDP) growth; these sources looked for from a political perspective, analyzing stakeholder's relations.
