ABSTRACT
North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006 appears to have marked a turning point that has affected the tactics of both the United States (US) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the six-party talks have remained the primary vehicle for negotiating on this issue. This chapter examines possible lessons learned from the first North Korean nuclear crisis, reviews the decision to establish the six-party framework, and analyzes the tactics and strategies of the US and DPRK, respectively, as well as the other parties to the talks. Despite the tougher rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration, the North Korean side appeared to have high hopes that the Clinton administration's policy of rapprochement with North Korea would continue. Despite North Korea's isolation, the nuclear test ironically worked as a catalyst for renewed six-party negotiations since none of the parties including China, South Korea, and the US were willing to bear the costs that would accompany failed diplomacy.
