ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the interrelationship between the mode of representation and the mode of legitimation of a constitution-making event on the one hand and the persistence of authoritarian regimes, on the other. It looks at the relationship between the constitution-making process and conflict resolution with a view to testing the hypothesis that constitutional bargains struck in a conflict resolution setting cannot be conducted according to participatory ideals. The chapter addresses that whether the constitution-making process has any impact on the probability of a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It focuses on constitution-making in post-authoritarian setting. Transitions to democracy typically involve conflict between a number of groups within society. The old Swiss constitutional order was a remarkably loose patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions in which the constituent units, the cantons, operated largely as sovereign powers. The Indian Constituent Assembly had its first sitting on 9 December 1946, eight months before India achieved independence.
