ABSTRACT
Arendt is quick to warn us never to rely upon that very thinking whose value she evidences when she detects it as lacking in an Eichmann. The bifurcation appears also between the pictures of judging as a kind of withdrawal to pure spectatorship, and of an activity that lies within our practical, social and political involvements in the world. Critics commonly insist that this bifurcation is an unresolved weakness in Arendt's thinking. When Arendt writes of the world of thinking as against the world of willing, she refers to intractable problems in the first two of Kants Critiques about the need to distinguish their zones of operation and, at same time, the need to relate two so as to make empirical life subject to pure thought and moral will. The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice tells us that to force thought into the open is to mortify it. It is to exploit ones own thinking, as if to plagiarize oneself.
