ABSTRACT
The question of whether and how religion ought to be defined has long engaged both sociologists and lawyers (see, for example, Idinopulos and Wilson 1998; Platvoet and Molendijk 1999). Weber and Durkheim put forward contrasting views as to the usefulness of a preliminary (or working) definition of religion. Whilst Weber contended that ‘definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study’ (1978, 399), Durkheim argued that a preliminary definition was required in order to ‘avoid focusing by mistake on ideas and practices that are not religious or conversely overlooking genuinely religious phenomena’ (2001, 25). Durkheim's rationale for a preliminary definition is as persuasive for the practising lawyer as it is for the scholar (Sandberg, 2006b; forthcoming). In both cases, a definition serves as a basis of inclusion and exclusion. Certain groups are not studied by the scholar or denied legal protection on the grounds that they are not religions.
