ABSTRACT
Introduction This chapter deals primarily with the issue of freedom of conscience in Morocco. This is one of the fundamental issues at stake in matters of religious pluralism, as well as political pluralism. It is evident that, in the history of Western Europe, the development of democracy came about largely as a result of dealing with religious issues; this is also the case for Muslim countries, where democratization has, to varying degrees, revolved around the same question and therefore centers on the same issues of freedom of conscience. The challenge for Muslim countries in this regard is first directly linked to the recognition of individuality and the rights that constitute it. From this direct perspective, the issue of freedom of conscience can be formulated as follows: how near or far are Muslim countries, Morocco in particular, from considering freedom of conscience as an ideal of a desirable social and political order as defined by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? This direct challenge of freedom of conscience occurs within the broader context of modernization of Muslim societies. The issue of freedom of conscience in Muslim countries in general, and in Morocco in particular, lies within the realm of family law, an area where law and religion unavoidably intersect. The problem with the relationship between law and religion is the fact that religion (or religious adherents) and the law (or the judiciary) constitute two distinct types of norms. From the perspective of historical origins, the religious norm could be the matrix from which the legal norm emerged before becoming autonomous. But once this autonomy comes about, the legal norm tends to exclude religious norms, or at least becomes the gatekeeper past which religious norms must pass. This change or transformation involves passing from a norm based on the authority of the supernatural, of some divine transcendental being, or of sanctified traditions, to some positive norm, that is, one based on the unilateral or deliberate will of political authority to define a certain order of social relationships. This can be expressed as a transition from heteronomy to autonomy. Once this change is complete, legal norms tend to predominate. Religious norms no longer affect the socio-political order, at least not directly. Where this is not the case, as in Muslim countries, religious and legal norms tend to be combined. This will obviously lead to certain ambivalence in the socio-political order. This ambivalence can be perceived and analyzed as a certain impotence or powerlessness of a socio-political order to emerge from heteronomy and make the transition to autonomy. It can alternatively be analyzed as a path along which a socio-political order navigates its own transformation, in a pragmatic and evolutionary manner.
