ABSTRACT
This chapter examines whether modern science is intrinsically reductionist. There appear to be three candidate versions of reductionism: determinism, technological reductionism, and materialism. It examines some of the philosophical difficulties with determinist views in terms of the "indexicality" of human concepts. Contrary to those philosophers who try to claim that the quantum effects, such as nonlocality, are restricted to the micro-domain, experimental evidence indicates the contrary. Contemporary scientific materialism or physicalism is a philosophical materialism. Physical laws mathematically fall into the same category as games. As physicalism, it tries to piggyback, so to speak, upon the social prestige of science in the hope that some of that prestige will rub off and bolster its implausible views. However, this arrangement of social institutions does not exist on its own. It is a human creation that only continues to exist through the human allegiances and practices that maintain it.
