ABSTRACT
In the fall of 1950, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that China would not intervene in Korea while forces of the United Nations Command (UNC) were advancing northward. Even after the massive invasion of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Force (CPVF) had started and some Chinese prisoners were in UNC detention, the CIA did not alter its conclusion (Kuhns 1997). The world was shocked when the CPVF launched its first offensive to push UNC forces back. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UNC, informed Washington that he faced an “entirely new war” in Korea (MacArthur 1964: 375). Inquiry into the reasoning and policy process of China’s entry into the war also has experienced dramatic changes. Allen S. Whiting (1960) reflects the earlier understanding with his emphasis on Beijing’s reluctance to enter the war; the young People’s Republic of China (PRC) was forced to send troops into Korea only when the UNC advance threatened directly China’s border security. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, more Chinese and Soviet primary sources became available for the first time, which facilitated a wave of new studies with multinational and multilingual characteristics. A more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of China’s intervention in Korea thus emerged with emphases on not only national security concerns, but also on ideological and cultural aspects, as well as on the complexities of alliance politics between Beijing, P’yŏngyang, and Moscow.
