ABSTRACT
A misunderstanding within medical ethics currently exists over what exactly is meant by the term ‘personal’ in personalised medicine. Does medical ethics, that notoriously accuses personalised medicine of not being personal, step into the dualistic segregation of material and immaterial, making the same misjudgements on the opposite side that they blame a molecular-oriented medicine for? Without saying personalised medicine was all negative, medical theorists such as Bergdolt (2011) and Gadebusch-Bondio and Michl (2010) hold mutatis mutandis that the term ‘personal’ is not used properly when only being related to a somatic-oriented medicine. Such vague statements made by Bergdolt, Gadebusch-Bondio and others only focus on an assumed public understanding, but are unjust to physicians who try to cure people, who do not fall into two separate parts of body and soul, by personalised medicine.
