ABSTRACT
Introduction System trespassing (i.e. the unauthorized use of a computer system [Furnell, 2002]) and invasion of computer privacy have become common global problems. Almost one in five people in both the United States and the United Kingdom reported experiencing the hacking of an online account in 2012 (Bursztein, 2013; Hernandez-Castro & Boiten, 2013), and over 740 million records were exposed in 2013 in the U.S. as a result of numerous system trespassing incidents targeting governmental and private organizations (Online Trust Alliance, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the increasing number of trespassing incidents and the growing cost to their victims (Ponemon Institute, 2013), there has been little concerted effort in the criminological field to understand the deterrability of system trespassers (Choi, 2011), their decision-making processes and their behaviors during a system trespassing event. We believe that this is unfortunate because insights regarding system trespassers’ responses to situational stimuli in an attacked computer system might contribute to our understanding of offenders’ decision-making processes in cyberspace, as well as support the design of sensitive and human-oriented security solutions that could mitigate the consequences of system trespassing events to both computer systems and individuals.
