ABSTRACT
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the norms48 but they are worthy of a short mention at this point for two reasons: The first part of Ruggie’s mandate in 2005 involved clarifying some of the contentious concepts used by the norms and the hostile reception that the norms received from much, but not all, of the corporate sector49 and some states50 is unlikely not to have had an influence on how Ruggie undertook his task and what he considered was possible in terms of devising a structure that would achieve broad acceptability.51 In 2006 Ruggie explained that his operating credo was one of ‘principled pragmatism’; a commitment to ‘strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights… coupled with a pragmatic attachment to what works best in creating change’.52 This view when taken with his ex post facto comments about the desire to avoid his mandate being side-tracked into lengthy discussions about the status of legal texts and his position being instead that he wanted to get the ‘parameters and the perimeters of business and human rights locked down in… policy terms…which could be acted upon immediately and on which future progress could be built’ would seem to suggest that the norms and their failure was on his mind throughout his mandate.53 Ruggie ameliorated two of the most contentious parts54 of the norms early in his tenure; he set up multi-stakeholder consultations that canvassed opinion across five continents,55 a practice that he continued throughout his mandate,56 and he abandoned attempts to base corporate liability on direct obligation, focusing instead on obligations flowing through states for violations of international criminal and humanitarian law.57 In relation to corporations he sets out responsibilities which while not binding are intended to be a basis for the monitoring and, if necessary, remediation of corporate conduct.
