ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to assess the impact of party regulation on the party competition in Croatia. It discusses the descriptive review of party regulation development in Croatia since 1990 with regard to constitutionalization of parties, party law and other regulations with regard to party organization and party finances. The chapter analyzes party competition from two angels: governmental efficacy and electoral representativeness. The Croatian case is tentatively offered as an example of paradoxical mechanisms by which party cartelization can function. The legislation regulating the organizational aspects of political parties was originally passed in 1990 as the Law on Political Organizations by the reformed communists and then Socialist parliament, exactly between the first and the second round of the first democratic elections in Croatia. The chapter reviews the model of party financing in Croatia, following K. H. Nassmacher: regulation of party income, regulation of party expenditure, transparency issues regulation and enforcement of measures by monitoring bodies, supervision procedures and sanctions.
