ABSTRACT

There is no real necessity to value religious people and communities positively. From a secular point of view, it normally suffices to tolerate them within reason. However, secular contemporaries pursuing a moral project, the objectives of which lie beyond their personal sphere, are usually looking for allies to contribute to their enterprise. The more comprehensive a project appears to be, the more they must wish that every possible agent, be it an individual or collective, participates in the attempt to achieve the project's objectives. If therefore—to put it bluntly—non-religious people pursue the moral shaping of the entire human lifeworld, they will necessarily seek support from all potential agents, including religious agents. So, tentatively, if we take for granted that every agent is ethically obligated to pursue the moral shaping of the entire human lifeworld, it follows that, from a secular perspective, religious people and communities should not only be tolerated, but rather be regarded as possible cooperation partners, at least in ethical matters. This applies all the more because religious agents usually have strong moral convictions and motivations. 1