ABSTRACT

As a post-Kantian philosopher, the fundamental motive of Alan Gewirth was to justify morality employing logic via the concept of human agency and to stress the reciprocity of absolute human rights to freedom and well-being. 1 There are few social groups who have suffered the same human rights violations as people with an intellectual disability; their collective history is one of ritual devaluation and exclusion by and from mainstream society. 2 Over the centuries, such individuals have been subject to incarceration in institutions to receive not only ‘care’, but also ensure their detention. 3 Denial of basic rights is still problematic and abuses have been (and continue to be) widespread globally in ongoing discourses linked to thinly veiled support for eugenics. 4 Although in most Western countries, the process of de-institutionalization was well underway in the 1990s, people with disabilities in general have been slow to access and enjoy their human rights, and for this reason, the 2008 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was brought into being. The CRPD did not conceive of any new rights for people with a disability; rather, it reiterated a new commitment to the realization of existing rights. This chapter is specifically concerned with integrating Alan Gewirth's moral position with ‘disability rights’ through critical reflection on a rights-based research project involving young people who have Down syndrome.