ABSTRACT
This chapter explores Wittgenstein's ties with the Circle in the context of Philosophical Remarks, and indicate some fruitful results of their proximity. It explains Wittgenstein's own understanding of verificationism with the background of his comprehensive 'grammar' in Philosophical Remarks and of some views defended in the Circle. The chapter looks at some characteristics of 'verificationism' in order to point out various aspects of the idea that need to be taken into account if we want to see what Wittgenstein does with it. It shows why he presupposes a variation of the criterion of verification already in his project of a phenomenological language and subsequently broadens its use in Philosophical Remarks. The chapter describes the fruitfulness of Wittgenstein's ties with the Circle and the possible roots of misunderstandings concerning physicalism and hypotheses that generated plagiarism accusations. It shows why 'arbitrariness' is rather trivial if one accepts Wittgenstein's understanding of ordinary sentences as hypotheses.
