Introduction

Pakistan’s third transition to civilian rule, which was triggered by the onset of the Lawyers’ Movement in March 2007 and formally began with the general elections a year later, has been markedly distinct from the previous two democratic spells of 1971-77 and 1988-99 due to the starkly different nature of recent social and political transformations. The emergence of an independent judiciary, a proactive civil society, a vibrant media, and a growing consensus among major political parties and public opinion in general for sustaining democracy are particular attributes of this transition. Consequently, the country was able to experience the first-ever peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another through the general elections of May 2013. The elections brought Nawaz Sharif, the leader of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) to power for the third time as prime minister. These critical developments defied the previous pattern of politics in Pak istan, when the military was able to rule directly for half of its history and indirectly during most of the rest through successive constitutional manipulations and interventions in politics. Despite structural shortcomings in the prevailing procedural democracy, newfound resilience of civilian leadership, adverse internal security and economic conditions, and external geo-political circumstances have emerged as constraints against direct military intervention. Emboldened by its electoral triumph, the Sharif government put former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf on trial for treason, decided to resume peace talks with India and political reconciliation in Afghanistan, and opted for negotiations with the terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These actions signalled an attempt on the part of civilian leadership to take a lead on national security and foreign policy and consolidate democratic gains in the country. However, within just over a year of the Sharif regime’s coming to power, democratic gains of the debut political transition of 2013 started to reverse. In June 2014, the army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against the TTP in North Waziristan. Two months later, Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) and cleric Tahirul Qadri led anti-government protests in Islamabad for several weeks, accusing Prime Minister Sharif of coming to power through rigged elections and demanding his resignation. While protestors failed to achieve this goal, they certainly weakened the government. In the strident political culture of

Pakistan, a number of minor political crises are expected to emerge such as the recent brawl over the Panama Leaks, however the 2014 protests were the first major crisis after the 2013 elections that altered the political power equation and deserve to be given due consideration here. Later in the year, renewed tensions with India and subsequent terrorist attacks in India blamed on Pakistan based Jaish-e-Muhammad put Sharif ’s plan for peace with the South Asian rival in jeopardy. Furthermore, the deadly TTP attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014 further weakened civilian authority, when both ruling and opposition political parties acceded to a military-backed National Action Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism and lifted the years-long ban on capital punishment. In January 2015, they also approved the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment to establish military courts for trying terror suspects. Since then, the military top brass has dominated internal security, for instance, through the NAP-mandated provincial apex committees. Army Chief General Raheel Sharif remained in the media spotlight for proactive engagements at home and diplomatic tours abroad. For its part, the Sharif government has avoided confrontation with the military over India policy and Musharraf ’s trial. Its interests have increasingly converged with those of the military over internal security issues such as the operation against the TTP and the rehabilitation campaign in North Waziristan as well as the anti-corruption drive in Sindh and campaign against armed criminals in Karachi. The government has prioritized major economic developmental projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where civil-military interests also fundamentally converge. Politics revolving around the traditional civil-military contestation for power, however, seems to show diverse trends. While the July 2015 verdict of the Judicial Commission, which found no evidence of any systematic rigging in the 2013 elections, re-energized the government,1 the August 2015 decision of the Supreme Court to allow the military courts to function empowered the military establishment.2 Subsequent events through the year 2016 also showed a mixed trend, including the political firestorm that the Panama Leaks generated in the country – with civilian and military interests competing over one issue and converging over another.3 Throughout Pakistani history, the pendulum of power has swung between prolonged military rules and unstable civilian orders. While uncertainty prevails over how current politico-military arrangements will unfold in the future, it is worth investigating whether, in the wake of apparent resurgence of the military, the familiar pattern of praetorian politics has made a comeback in the country. Or is this an over-statement, given the recent pro-democratic shifts in its political, social and economic conditions as well as external circumstances and, more importantly, instances of civil-military convergence over internal security and economic issues? In other words, is the all-too-familiar framework for analysing Pakistani politics – where the civil and the military are treated as two monoliths of a zero-sum-game waging a perpetual struggle for power – any more relevant? The issue, in essence, is about the present state and future prospect of democracy in Pakistan, which this volume seeks to address – by offering a variety of

critical perspectives on the current democratic transition, its underlying sources, attributes and constraints as well as prospects of sustainability. Its key objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of the complex reality of Pakistani politics today, especially with respect to areas of conflict, competition and cooperation in civil-military relations. The authors of its 13 chapters use multidisciplinary approaches to scrutinize both the broad contours and specific features of this transition. They cover a range of relevant topics such as the history of civil-military conflict and its current orientation, the role of judiciary, urbanization and its implications, political economy of change, religious militancy and governability crisis, ethnicity and devolution of power. Before we introduce their respective perspectives, it makes sense to critically assess the available literature on democratic transition and Pakistan’s current political trajectory, what its key limitations are, and whether or why there is a need for alternative perspectives on the subject.