ABSTRACT
Introduction Having joined the international climate change regime in the early 1990s, China has been confronted with great challenges and opportunities. The country has been identified as a key actor in global climate talks, especially since becoming the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007 (Liang 2010: 61), and has undergone increasing international reputational pressure to make a legally binding commitment to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE). China is a key player in international climate negotiations for two reasons: first, considering that it is responsible for the largest share of GHGE, any global GHGE reduction agreement cannot really achieve its goal without China’s contribution; second, as the largest (rapidly) developing country in the world with an influential voice in the UN Security Council, ‘its status and influence in the G-77 of Third World states give China prominence in climate negotiations’ (Heggelund 2007: 159). For the international climate change regime, China has become a system relevant actor with considerable structural power. After the 2008 global financial crisis, climate change negotiations have undergone a great shift. First, due to the rapid economic development and high energy consumption of major emerging countries (such as the BASIC countries – China, India, South Africa and Brazil), negotiation interaction shifted from a ‘NorthSouth’ conflict, to opposition between large and small GHG emitters. The split among the G77 Group has grown since the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15). Pressures to reduce GHGE in developing countries are not only coming from developed countries but also from within the group of developing countries (including the least developed countries). While under great international pressure, China was surprised to find itself being blamed for the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference. This has had a profound impact on its subsequent approach to the international climate change talks (Yu 2015). Second, along with the increased role of large transitional countries in global governance and the relative decline of the EU’s climate leadership, the BASIC countries, led by China, emerged at the Copenhagen conference as central players in the international climate negotiations. China’s rising entrepreneurial leadership attracted special attention (see below).
