ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses whether the view that first-order moral beliefs are insulated from moral skepticism is defensible. It examines whether a moral skeptic who adopts moral fictionalism can coherently hold that his first-order moral beliefs are unaffected by his skepticism about their truth or their epistemic justification. The chapter determines whether contemporary moral skeptics are in general committed to there being insulation between first- and second-order views. It analyzes the notion of insulation: after presenting Myles Burnyeat's treatment of it, and distinguishes between three main types of insulation, namely logical, epistemic, and psychological. The chapter examines J. L. Mackie's stance on the phenomenon of insulation and his pragmatic conception of morality. It presents moral fictionalism in more detail and considers whether any of the kinds of insulation is compatible with the adoption of a fictionalist stance. The chapter compares moral fictionalism with a position known as "moral conservationism".
