ABSTRACT
Error theories can be built on considerations of incoherence, propounding that moral thinking is flawed because it involves built-in contradictions. If relaxed philosophers are right, metaphysically driven error theories are mistaken: justification of moral ontological commitment does not depend on domain-external, metaphysical considerations. This chapter considers what error theorists might gain, but also what they may lose, by adopting this modified understanding of their position. It focuses on inferentialist conception of error theories in greater detail. The specific inferentialist understanding of error theories neither proffers a form of representationalism nor is defined by negative theses on successful representation. According to inferentialism's central metasemantic thesis, statements possess their specific conceptual content by virtue of the inferential role which they assume within the practice of making statements and asking for reasons. Inferentialist take establishes error theories neither as a distinctive metaethical position nor as a form of external skepticism, and thus fails to advance the debate.
