ABSTRACT
During some of the years between the two oil crises the bargaining stance of buyers seemed rather intimidated when dealing with OPEC governments and their national companies. Most of the majors, enjoying privileged access to crude, were beholden some of the governments they did business with. Oil-importing governments, while enjoying sovereignty, had nothing to offer that they could deliver that OPEC governments wanted as much as the importers wanted oil. The increases in OPEC government during a fairly sustained softening of demand, demonstrated some power, on the basis of government, to move contrary to market pressures. It is difficult to explain those increases as obvious responses to the balance of demand and supply in the market. By summer 1975, demand for crude strengthened slightly; however, this demand seemed to be for short-term stockpiling in anticipation of another OPEC price increase. And that increase came in due time: Saudi Arabia raised the price of its marker crude and other producers.
