ABSTRACT
The past decade has seen a major shift in global economic dynamism and power distribution. Ideological as well as pragmatic factors colour established and emerging powers’ attitudes towards the emerging world order. Moreover, the growing political, economic, and ideological diversity present in the international system has dissipated the like-mindedness that guided post-war collaboration on issues of global governance. The impacts of the global financial crisis, Eurozone troubles, and turbulence in emerging markets required both established and emerging powers to rethink their behaviour in arenas of global economic governance. Although there are a plethora of institutions, organisations and networks that deal with issues of global economic governance, this article focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Group of Twenty Leaders’ Summit (G20). These organisations are particularly interesting, because even though they have different organisational logics, established and emerging powers formally sit as equals in both (i.e. with equal voting power). Moreover, Brazil plays an active and significant role in both of them. The main aim of the article is to examine to what extent Brazil’s foreign policy
actions, negotiating positions and diplomatic strategies in global governance institutions contribute to supporting its national interest and foreign policy aims. It compares Brazil’s preferences and behaviour in the WTO and G20 to
explain how Brazil appears to be moving from a material based definition of its national interest to a more complex one that includes both material and prestige/ status based aspects. It argues that by prioritising leadership of the Global South/developing countries, in addition to its own direct material interests, Brazil has shifted its foreign policy behaviour to the point where it sometimes seems to support positions that contradict its immediate material interests. The key sources for the analysis are public speeches and media interviews by top officials complemented by personal interviews with Brazilian diplomats. My aim is to provide evidence that provokes discussion rather than present definitive conclusions on the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy. The analysis is developed in four sections: (1) Brazil’s traditional foreign policy aims and negotiating strategy; (2) Brazil’s positions and actions in the WTO, with special reference to the “Bali package” signed in December 2013; (3) Brazil’s positions and actions in the G20, with special reference to the St Petersburg Action Plan signed in September 2013; and (4) an evaluation of Brazilian diplomatic strategy and foreign policy achievements as well as some comments on whether established powers can hope to work with and accommodate Brazil’s interests and preferences. A secondary aim of the analysis is to consider whether traditional approaches
to studying Brazilian foreign policy still provide a complete and convincing explanation for Brazil’s evolving discourse and actions in the foreign policy arena. Traditionally, the academic literature emphasises liberal institutionalism when discussing Brazil’s approach to issues of global economic governance, given its active engagement in international institutions and international regimes as well as its valuing of international law. However, recent diplomatic language and behaviour raise questions about the continuing validity of these interpretations, or at least their ability to provide an exhaustive explanation. The article briefly explores whether constructivism-with its emphasis on socially constructed relations and interpretations of international politics as well as attention to values, ideas and identities-might afford useful insights into understanding Brazil’s positions in the WTO and G20.
