ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that considerations arising from queer oppression can furnish support for pacifist positions. The first consideration concerns the nature and strength of the moral presumption against violence. Violence undermines a victim’s agency, coercing them to betray their identities, not unlike “reparative therapy.” The second consideration concerns the moral presumption against conscription. There is a moral presumption against violence, at least when it is directed at individuals with a particular kind of moral status. One sort of moral status that guarantees such presumptive protection against violence is being a rights-bearer, and a commonplace right is the right not to be subjected to unjust violence. The chapter explores whether there are considerations arising from queer oppression that lend credence to some version of pacifism. It defends the view that there are such considerations. The chapter explores the moral presumption against violence, arguing that the wrong-making properties of violence are shared by other coercive activities, such as “reparative therapy.”
