ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that it is not necessary for scientists to incorporate nonepistemic normative judgements in scientific reasoning, and neither are they morally required to do so. It considers a philosophical controversy that revolves around the following two propositions: scientists necessarily and inevitably incorporate non-epistemic normative judgements in scientific reasoning; scientists are morally required to explicitly incorporate non-epistemic normative judgements in scientific reasoning. AIRs pertain to the incorporation of non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning. Proponents of AIRs are worried about the practical consequences of wrongly accepting or not accepting scientific hypotheses. The ethics of scientific policy advice is of course a function of the political system and the way collectively binding decisions are made in a society. AIRs assume that scientific findings be decision-relevant. The chapter describes a normative ideal for decision-relevant scientific policy advice in a democratic society according to which scientists deal with substantial uncertainties without relying on non-epistemic values.
